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1. Introduction 
Sovereign credit ratings are a condensed assessment of a government’s ability and 
willingness to repay its public debt on time. Such measures of the probability of default are 
particularly relevant for international financial markets, economic agents and governments. 
First, sovereign ratings are a key determinant of the interest rates a country faces in the 
international financial market and therefore of its borrowing costs. Second, sovereign 
ratings may have a constraining impact on the ratings assigned to domestic banks or 
companies. Third, some institutional investors have lower bounds for the risk they can 
assume in their investments. Consequently, they choose their bond portfolio composition 
taking into account the credit risk perceived by the rating notations. Therefore, it is 
important, both for governments and for financial markets, to understand what factors 
rating agencies put more emphasis on, when attributing a rating score. 
We perform an empirical analysis of foreign currency sovereign debt ratings, using 
data from the three main rating agencies: Fitch Ratings, Moody’s, and Standard & Poor’s 
(S&P). We have compiled a panel data set on sovereign debt ratings, macroeconomic data, 
and qualitative variables for a wide range of countries starting in 1995. The use of panel 
data is appealing because it allows examining not only how the agencies attribute a rating, 
but also how they decide on upgrades and downgrades.  
Our main contribution to the existing literature is methodological. The fact that a 
country’s rating does not vary much across time raises some econometric problems. On the 
one hand, fixed effects estimation only informs us on how the agency decides on upgrades 
and downgrades, because the country dummy captures the average rating. On the other 
hand, random effects estimation is inadequate because of the correlation between the 
country specific error and the regressors. We salvage the random effects approach by 
modelling the country specific error, which in practical terms implies adding time-averages 
  3
of the explanatory variables as additional time-invariant regressors. This setting allows us 
to make a distinction between short and long-run determinants of sovereign ratings. 
Regarding the empirical modelling strategy, we follow the two main strands in the 
literature. We use linear regression methods on a linear transformation of the ratings and 
we also estimate our specification using both ordered probit and random effects ordered 
probit methods. The latter is the best procedure for panel data as it considers the existence 
of an additional normally distributed cross-section error. This approach allows us to 
determine the cut-off points throughout the rating scale, as well as to test whether a linear 
quantitative transformation of the ratings is a good approximation. 
The results show that four core variables have a consistent short-run impact on 
sovereign ratings: the level of GDP per capita, real GDP growth, the public debt level and 
the government balance. Government effectiveness, as well as the level of external debt 
and external reserves are important long-run determinants. A dummy reflecting past 
sovereign defaults is also found significant. Fiscal variables seem more important 
determinants than previously found in the literature.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section Two gives an overview of the rating 
systems and related literature. Section Three explains our methodology. Section Four 
reports the estimation and prediction results. Section Five concludes. 
 
2. Rating systems and literature 
Sovereign ratings are assessments of the relative likelihood of default. The rating 
agencies look at a wide range of elements, from solvency factors affecting the capacity to 
repay the debt, to socio-political factors that might influence the willingness to pay of the 
borrower. 
An earlier study on the determinants of sovereign ratings by Cantor and Packer 
(1996) concluded that the ratings can be largely explained by a small set of variables: per 
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capita income, GDP growth, inflation, external debt, level of economic development, and 
default history. Further studies incorporated, for instance, macroeconomic variables like 
the unemployment rate or the investment-to-GDP ratio (Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, 2005). In 
papers focussing on currency crises, several external indicators such as foreign reserves, 
current account balance, exports or terms of trade seem to play an important role (Monfort 
and Mulder, 2000). Indicators of how the government conducts its fiscal policy, in 
particular budget balance and government debt, can also be relevant, as well as variables 
that assess political risk, like corruption or social indexes (Depken et al., 2007).  
Regarding the econometric approach, there are two strands in the literature. The first 
uses linear regression methods on a numerical representation of the ratings. The study by 
Cantor and Packer, applies OLS regressions to a linear representation of the ratings, on a 
cross section of 45 countries. This methodology was also pursued by Afonso (2003) and 
Butler and Fauver (2006). Using OLS on a numerical representation of the ratings is quite 
simple and allows for a straightforward generalization to panel data by doing fixed or 
random effects estimation (Mora, 2006; Monfort and Mulder, 2000).  
Although estimating the determinants of ratings using these approaches has, in 
general, a good predictive power, it faces some critiques.  As ratings are a qualitative 
ordinal measure, traditional estimation techniques on a linear representation of the ratings 
are not adequate. First, they implicitly assume that the difference between any two adjacent 
categories is always equal. Besides, even if this is true, in the presence of elements in the 
top and bottom category, the coefficient estimates are still biased, even in large samples. 
To overcome this critique, another strand of the literature uses ordered response 
models, for instance, Hu et al. (2002), Bissoondoyal-Bheenick (2005) and Depken et al. 
(2007). Although ordered probit should be considered the preferred estimation procedure, 
it is not entirely satisfying. The ordered probit asymptotic properties do not generalise for 
small samples, so it is problematic to estimate it using only a cross-section of countries. It 
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is, therefore, imperative to maximize the number of observation by having a panel data, but 
when doing so, one has to be careful. Indeed, the generalization of ordered probit to panel 
data is not simple, because of the country specific effect. Furthermore, within this 
framework, the need to have many observations makes it harder to perform robustness 
analysis by, for instance, partitioning the sample.  
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Linear regression framework 
Our starting point is the straightforward generalization of the a cross-section 
specification to panel data, 
 it it i i itR X Z a      , (1) 
where we have: Rit – quantitative variable, obtained by a linear transformation; Xit is 
a vector containing time varying variables and Zi is a vector of time invariant variables. 
The index i (i=1,…,N) denotes the country, the index t (t=1,…,T) indicates the period and 
ai stands for the individual effects for each country i. Additionally, we assume that the 
disturbances μit are independent across countries and across time.  
There are three ways to estimate this equation: pooled OLS, fixed effects or random 
effects estimation. Under standard conditions all estimators are consistent and the ranking 
of the three methods in terms of efficiency is clear: random effects is preferable to fixed 
effects, which is preferable to pooled OLS. What we mean by standard conditions is 
whether the country specific error is uncorrelated with the regressors E(ai| Xit, Zi)=0. If this 
is the case one should opt for the random effects estimation, while if this condition does 
not hold, both the pooled OLS and the random effects estimation give inconsistent 
estimates and fixed effects estimation is preferable.  
In our case, it seems natural that the country specific effect is correlated with the 
regressors, so one may be tempted to say that the “fixed effects estimation” is the best 
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strategy.1 This conclusion is flawed. As there is not much variation of a country’s rating 
over time, the dummies included in the regression capture the country’s average rating, 
while the other variables only capture movements in the ratings across time. Although 
statistically correct, a fixed effects regression is partially stripped of meaning.  
There are two ways of rescuing a random effects approach when there is correlation 
between the country specific error and the regressors. One is to do the Hausman-Taylor IV 
estimation, but we would need instruments that are uncorrelated with ai, which are not easy 
to find. We opt for a different approach that consists on modelling the error term ai. This 
approach, introduced by Mundlak (1978) and described in Wooldridge (2002), is usually 
applied when estimating non-linear models, as IV estimation proves to be a Herculean 
task.2 As we shall see, the application to our case is quite successful. The idea is to give an 
explicit expression for the correlation between the error and the regressors, stating that the 
expected value of the country specific error is a linear combination of time-averages of the 
regressors iX . 
 ( |  , )  ii it iE a X Z X . (2) 
If we modify our initial equation (1), with ti ia X    we get 
 iXit it i i itR X Z         , (3) 
where i  is an error term by definition uncorrelated with the regressors. In practical terms, we 
eliminate the problem by including a time-average of the explanatory variables as 
additional time-invariant regressors.  We can rewrite (3) as: 
 ( X ) ( )Xi iit it i i itR X Z            . (4) 
This expression is quite intuitive.     can be interpreted as a long-term effect 
(e. g. if a country has a permanent high unemployment what is the effect on the rating), 
                                                          
1 In several studies (Depken et al., 2007, and Mora, 2006) the random effects estimator is rejected by the 
Hausman test. We confirm this by estimating equation (1) using random effects and performing the Hausman 
test: the null hypothesis of no correlation is rejected with a p-value of  0.000. 
2 See, for instance, Hajivassiliou and Ioannides (2007). 
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while  is a short-term effect (e. g. if a country manages to reduce unemployment this year 
what is the impact on the rating). This intuitive distinction is useful for policy purposes as 
it can tell what a country can do to improve its rating in the short to medium-term. 
Alternatively, we can interpret δ as the coefficient of the cross-country determinants of the 
credit rating. We estimate equation (4) by random effects. The way we modelled the error 
term can be considered successful if the coefficients η are significant and if the Hausman 
test indicates no correlation between the regressors and the new error term.3 
 
3.2. Ordered response framework 
We also estimate the determinants of sovereign debt ratings under a limited 
dependent variable framework. The ordered probit is a natural approach for this type of 
problem, because the rating is a discrete variable and reflects an order in terms of 
probability of default. Each rating agency makes a continuous evaluation of a country’s 
credit-worthiness, embodied in an unobserved latent variable *itR . The latent variable has a 
linear form and depends on the same set of variables as before, 
 * ( X ) Xi iit it i i itR X Z          . (5) 
The rating agencies have several cut-off points to draw up the boundaries of each 
rating category. The final rating is given by 
 
*
16
*
16 15
*
15 14
*
1
 ( )                          
 ( 1)                  
 ( 2)                     
( 3)                      
it
it
it it
it
AAA Aaa if R c
AA Aa if c R c
R AA Aa if c R c
B B if c R
 
     


  

. (6) 
The parameters of equation (5) and (6), notably β, δ, λ and the cut-off points c1 to c16 
are estimated using maximum likelihood. As we have panel data, the generalization of 
                                                          
3 An alternative way would be to estimate β using fixed effects and regress the country dummies on the time 
averages of the regressors to estimate η. We do not follow such method because it cannot be generalized to 
ordered response models. 
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ordered probit is not straightforward, because instead of one error term, we now have two. 
Wooldridge (2002) describes two approaches to estimate the parameters. One “quick and 
dirty” possibility is to assume only one error term that is serially correlated within 
countries. We can then do the standard ordered probit estimation and use a robust variance-
covariance matrix to account for the serial correlation. The second possibility is a random 
effects ordered probit estimation, which considers both errors i and μit to be normally 
distributed, and maximizes the log-likelihood accordingly. The second approach should be 
considered the best one, but it has as a drawback the quite cumbersome calculations 
involved.4 
 
3.3. Explanatory variables  
Building on the evidence from the existing literature, we identify a set of variables 
that may determine sovereign ratings, aggregated in four main areas.  
Macroeconomic variables 
GDP per capita (+): richer economies are expected to have more stable institutions to 
prevent government over-borrowing and to be less vulnerable to exogenous shocks. 
Real GDP growth (+): higher real growth strengthens the government’s ability to repay 
outstanding obligations. 
Unemployment (–): a country with lower unemployment tends to have more flexible labour 
markets. In addition, lower unemployment reduces the fiscal burden of unemployment and 
social benefits while broadening the base for labour taxation.  
Inflation (+/–): on the one hand, it reduces the real stock of outstanding government debt in 
domestic currency, leaving more resources to cover foreign debt obligations. On the other 
hand, it is symptomatic of problems at the macroeconomic level. 
 
                                                          
4 The STATA procedure was created by Rabe-Hesketh et al. (2000) and substantially improved by Frechette 
(2001).  
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Government variables 
Government debt (–): a higher stock of outstanding government debt implies a higher 
interest burden and should correspond to a higher risk of default. 
Fiscal balance (+): large fiscal deficits absorb domestic savings and also suggest 
macroeconomic disequilibria. Persistent deficits may signal problems with the institutional 
environment for policy makers. 
Government effectiveness (+): high quality of public service delivery, competence of 
bureaucracy and lower corruption should improve the ability to service debt obligations.  
External variables 
External debt (–): the higher the external indebtedness, the higher the risk for additional 
fiscal burden, either directly due to a sell-off of foreign government debt or indirectly 
because of the need to support over-indebted domestic borrowers.  
Foreign reserves (+): higher (official) foreign reserves should shield the government from 
having to default on its foreign currency obligations. 
Current account balance (+/–): a higher current account deficit could signal an economy’s 
tendency to over-consume, undermining long-term sustainability. Alternatively, it could 
reflect rapid accumulation of investment, which should lead to higher growth and 
improved sustainability over the medium term.  
Other variables 
Default history (–): past sovereign defaults may indicate a great acceptance of reducing the 
outstanding debt burden via a default.  
European Union (+): countries that join the European Union (EU) improve their credibility 
as their economic policy is restricted and monitored by other member states. 
Regional dummies (+/–): some groups of countries of the same geographical location may 
have common characteristics that affect their rating. 
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4. Empirical analysis 
4.1. Data 
We build a ratings database with sovereign foreign currency rating, attributed by the 
three main rating agencies, S&P, Moody’s and Fitch Ratings. We cover a period 1970-
2005. The rating of a particular year is the rating attributed at 31st of December.5 We group 
the ratings in 17 categories by putting together the few observations below B-, which are 
given the value one, while AAA observations receive the value 17. In 2005, there are 130 
countries with a rating, though only 78 have a rating attributed by all three agencies.   
Given data availability for the explanatory variables, our estimations only cover the 
period 1995-2005. Fiscal balance, current account and government debt are in percentage 
of GDP, foreign reserves enter as percentage of imports and external debt as percentage of 
exports.  The variables inflation, unemployment, GDP growth, fiscal balance and current 
account enter as a 3-year average, reflecting the agencies’ approach to take out the effect of 
the business cycle when deciding on a sovereign rating. The external debt variable is taken 
from the World Bank and is only available for non-industrial countries, so for industrial 
countries we attribute the value zero, which is equivalent to having a multiplicative 
dummy. We include a dummy variable indicating a past default and a variable measuring 
the number of years since it last occurrence. This variable captures the recovery of 
credibility after a default. As for the dummy variable for EU, we consider that the rating 
agencies anticipated the EU accession. Thus we test the contemporaneous variable, as well 
as up to three leads. We find that for Moody’s and S&P the variable enters with two leads, 
while for Fitch we find no anticipation of EU accession. Regarding the regional dummies, 
only the dummies for Industrialised countries and for Latin America and Caribbean 
countries were significant. Overall, we have an unbalanced panel with 66 countries for 
                                                          
5 The compiled full historical rating dataset, including foreign and local currency ratings as well as credit 
rating outlooks, is available from the authors on request. 
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Moody’s, 65 for S&P and 58 for Fitch, with an average of 8 yearly observations per 
country. Each country experienced, on average, either one or two changes in its rating.6 
 
4.2. Linear panel results 
In light of the analytical considerations above, we focus the discussion on the random 
effects estimations (Table 1).7 
[Table 1] 
We report the results for each rating agency of a restricted and an unrestricted model. 
While the unrestricted model incorporates all variables, the restricted model contains only 
the variables which have a statistically significant impact. The restricted models are quite 
robust to alternative exclusion procedures. The explanatory power of the models is very 
high with R-square values around 0.95 in both restricted and unrestricted versions. We can 
also assess how successful our specification is. First, in most of the cases, the short and 
long–run coefficients of the explanatory variables are quite different, which implies that, if 
we did not include the additional regressors, we would be mispecifying the model.8 
Second, the models pass the Hausman test, which suggests that the country specific error is 
now uncorrelated with the regressors. 
The restricted models (columns 2, 4, and 6 in Table 1) reveal a homogenous set of 
explanatory variables across agencies. On the real side, the short-run coefficients of GDP 
per capita and GDP growth rates are significant for all three companies, but do not seem to 
have a long-run effect. An increase of 2 percentage points of GDP growth improves the 
                                                          
6 See Afonso et al. (2007) for a full list of variables, specifications and sources, notably IMF World 
Economic Outlook, World Bank Aggregate Governance Indicator and Jaimovich, Panizza (2006). 
7 We performed additional analysis, estimating the model using OLS and fixed effects and we have 
differentiated across sub-periods, ratings levels and exchange rate regimes. Results are not reported to 
conserve space, but can be found in Afonso et al. (2007). 
8 We perform the formal significance test by estimating equation (3) and testing directly the coefficients of 
the time averages of the explanatory variables. Average per capita GDP and government effectiveness are 
always significant at 5% for all agencies. In addition, average unemployment is significant for Moody´s, 
average government debt is significant for S&P and the average reserves-to-imports is significant for S&P 
and Fitch. None of the models without the additional variables pass the Hausman test. 
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rating by around 0.17 notches for Moody’s and S&P, while an increase of 6 percent of 
GDP per capita improves the rating by 0.1 notches. 
Regarding the fiscal variables, the coefficient of the government debt-to-GDP ratio as 
a difference from the average is significant for all three agencies. S&P and Fitch put more 
emphasis on this variable: a 10 percentage point decline improves the rating by 0.3 notches 
(0.15 notches for Moody’s). On the other hand, Moody’s puts more emphasis on the the 
government balance: a 3 percentage point decrease in the deficit raises Moody’s rating by 
0.2, compared to 0.1 in the other two agencies. Given their interdependence, one should 
not see these effects in isolation but rather together, which implies a high overall effect of 
fiscal policies on the ratings. Finally, the government effectiveness indicator is an 
important determinant of the rating in the long-run. An improvement of 1 point in the 
World Bank indicator translates into an improvement of 2 notches. The cross-country 
difference between the 10th and 90th percentile of the average government effectiveness 
indicator between countries is 2.5 points. Thus, it captures elements that account for 5 
notches difference between ratings.  
The external debt-to-exports ratio and the reserves–to-imports ratio are also 
significant. Increases in external debt drive the rating down in the short and long-run. The 
difference between the 10th and 90th percentile of the cross-country average external debt 
ratio is around 300, which corresponds to a cross-country difference of 3 notches for Fitch, 
2 notches for S&P, and 1.2 notches for Moody’s. External reserves are significantly 
positive, in the long-run for S&P and Fitch and in the short-run for Moody’s. The 
difference between the 10th  and 90th  percentile of the average reserves-to-import ratio is 
0.4, so they account for a 1.2 notch cross-country difference for Fitch and a 0.8 notches for 
S&P. The current account balance has a negative impact in the short-run. A current 
account deficit seems to be an indicator for the willingness of foreigners to cover the 
current account gap through loans and foreign investment. In this situation, a higher 
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current account deficit is associated with either higher credit-worthiness or good economic 
prospects of the economy and consequently a higher sovereign rating.  
EU and industrial country dummies are also significant for all agencies. If a country 
has previously defaulted on its debt, it is permanently penalized by 1 to 2 nothes. 
Beyond the set of core variables, the agencies appear to employ a limited number of 
additional variables. Fitch relies on the smallest set of additional variables, comprising 
government effectiveness and foreign currency reserves as deviation from the average. By 
contrast, Moody’s and S&P look at more factors, with a large degree of homogeneity 
between these two agencies. In particular, inflation is found to have a significantly 
negative impact, although with a relative small magnitude.  
Finally, the impact of the unemployment on the rating ilustrates the importance of 
distinguishing between short and long-run impacts. While the average (stuctural) level of 
unemployment has a significant negative impact on the rating by Moody’s, the short-run 
deviation from the average enters positively and significantly in the S&P model. 
Unemployment in the short run can be driven by re-adjustments of economic activity that 
might improve economic performance in the future. Also, structural reforms that raise 
unemployment in the short run but improve fiscal sustainability or economic prospects in 
the long run could explain this finding.  
 
4.4. Ordered probit results  
Ordered probit models should give additional insight into the determinants of 
sovereign ratings. As discussed, they generate estimates of the threshold values between 
rating notches allowing an assessment of the shape of the ratings curve.  
The results from the ordered probit estimations validate the findings highlighted 
above (see Table 2 for the random effects ordered probit). The core variables identified in 
the linear regressions also show up with the same sign. In addition, the ordered probit 
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models suggest the significance of more explanatory variables, particularly for Fitch. 
Finally, for the current account variable, the restricted specification for Moody’s shows a 
negative sign for deviations from the average, but a positive sign for the average. Similar 
sign switches also come out for S&P. This result confirms our priors. In the short run, a 
higher current account deficit is associated with either higher credit-worthiness or good 
economic prospects of the economy, but if the countries run permanent current account 
deficits, it negatively affects their ratings. 
[Table 2] 
The estimated threshold coefficients reported in the second part of Table 2 suggest that the 
linear specification, assumed for the panel regression, is broadly acceptable. Nevertheless, 
the econometric tests at the bottom of the tables reveal additional insights. For the 
restricted model of Moody’s, the test does not reject the null hypothesis of equal distances 
between thresholds, but the significance level is close to 10%. Indeed the estimated 
thresholds point to a relatively large jump between the ratings for BBB– and BBB. 
Countries close to the non-investment grade rating are given a wider range before they 
actually cross that threshold. For Fitch, the hypothesis of equal distances is rejected, as the 
thresholds for higher ratings are further apart than those of the lower ratings. In this case 
the kink lies at the A rating. For S&P, above investment grade, the distances between 
thresholds first decline and then increase, making the transition to the highest grades more 
difficult. 
 
4.5. Prediction analysis 
Our prediction analysis focuses on two elements: the prediction for the rating of each 
individual observation in the sample, as well as the prediction of movements in the ratings 
through time. For the random effects estimations we can have two predictions, with or 
without the country specific effect, i: 
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 ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( X ) Xi iit it i iR X Z        , (7a) 
 ˆ ˆ ˆ( X ) Xi iit it iR X Z      . (7b) 
We can estimate each country specific effect by taking the time average of the 
estimated residual for each country. As a result we can include or exclude this additional 
information that comes out of the estimation. We compute the fitted value and then round 
it to the closest integer between 1 and 17. For both ordered probit and the random effects 
ordered probit we fit the value of the latent variable, by setting the error term to zero, and 
match it up to the cut-off points to determine the predicted rating. Table 3 presents an 
overall summary of the prediction errors, using the restricted specifications. 
[Table 3] 
The random effects model including the estimated country effect is the method with 
the best fit. On average for the three agencies, it correctly predicts 70% of all observations 
and more than 95% of the predicted ratings lie within one notch (99% within two notches). 
This is expected, as the estimated country errors capture factors like political risk, 
geopolitical uncertainty and social tensions that are likely to systematically affect the 
ratings, therefore, they act as a correction for these factors. 
This additional information from the random effects estimation with the country 
specific effect is not useful if we want to make out-of-sample predictions. In that case, only 
the random effects estimation excluding the country error is comparable to the other 
specifications. We can see that, in general, both ordered probit and random effects ordered 
probit have a better fit. Overall, the simple ordered probit seems the best method as far as 
prediction in levels is concerned as it predicts correctly around 45% of all observations and 
more then 80% within one notch. 
Let’s now turn to how the models perform in predicting changes in ratings. Table 4 
presents the total number of sample upgrades (downgrades), the predicted number of 
upgrades (downgrades) and the ones that where correctly predicted. Over the sample 
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period, on average, there was a change of rating every six years for Moody’s and every 
five years for S&P and Fitch. A country was twice more likely to be upgraded than 
downgraded.9 
[Table 4] 
The models correctly predict between one third and one half of both upgrades and 
downgrades. The most noticeable difference between the models is not the number of 
correctly predicted changes, but the total number of predicted changes. In fact, the ordered 
probit and random effects ordered probit predict substantially more changes than the 
random effects estimation. For instance, for S&P, while random effects predict around 79 
upgrades and 50 downgrades, the ordered probit model predicts 102 upgrades and 64 
downgrades. This strengthens the idea that rating agencies smooth the ratings, along the 
lines discussed in Altman and Rijken (2004). It also suggests that linear methods might be 
better in capturing the inertia of rating agencies than ordered response models. 
 
4.6. Examples of specific country analysis 
In Table 5 we show the rating for some European and emerging countries in 1998 
and 2005. Then, we use the estimated short-run coefficients of the random effects ordered 
probit, together with the values for the relevant variables to disaggregate the overall 
prediction change in the rating of each agency into the contributions of the different blocks 
of explanatory variables: macroeconomic performance, government performance, external 
elements and the EU. The upper and lower bounds are computed by adding and subtracting 
one standard deviation to the point estimate of the coefficients. 
[Table 5] 
                                                          
9 This analysis is, in a way, limited as it does not capture upgrades/downgrades across multiple grades or 
multiple upgrades/downgrades within a year. Although this could be important to analyse particular cases, 
such as, currency crises, the cases of multiple upgades/downgrades are relatively few compared to the full 
sample. 
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Let’s compare, for instance, Portugal and Spain. In 1998 they both had an AA (Aa2) 
rating but in 2005 while Spain had been upgraded to AAA (Aaa) by all agencies, Portugal 
had been downgraded by S&P. For Portugal, the positive contribution of the 
macroeconomic performance was overshadowed by the negative government 
developments: the worsening of the budget deficit since 2000, the upward trend in 
government debt and the decline in the World Bank government effectiveness indicator. 
As for Spain, the good macroeconomic performance was the main cause of the upgrade, 
especially the reduction of structural unemployment since the mid nineties and the increase 
of GDP per capita due to the persistent high growth.  
As a final example we report the results for five emerging economies that have also 
been upgraded: Brazil, Mexico, Malaysia, Thailand and South Africa. For Brazil, Malaysia 
and Thailand the main positive contribution came from the external area specially the 
reduction of external debt and the increase in foreign reserves. This effect is stronger for 
Fitch. For Mexico and South Africa the contributions are balanced. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we have studied the determinants of global sovereign debt ratings using 
ratings from the three main international rating agencies for the period 1995-2005. Overall, 
our results point to a good performance of the estimated models across agencies and across 
time. 
Regarding the methodological approach, we have used linear regression methods and 
limited dependent variable models, by means of an ordered probit and random effects 
ordered probit estimations. The latter is the best estimation procedure using panel data, as 
it considers the existence of an additional cross-country error term. We have also employed 
a new specification that consists of including time averages of the explanatory variables as 
additional time-invariant regressors. On the one hand, it allows us to correct the problem of 
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correlation between the country specific error and the regressors. On the other hand, it 
allows us to distinguish between short-run and long-run effects of a variable on the 
sovereign rating level, which improves the economic interpretation of the results. 
Our results show that a set of core variables have a short-run impact on a country’s 
credit rating: per capita GDP; real GDP growth; government debt and government deficit. 
Government effectiveness, external debt, foreign reserves and sovereign default dummies 
are important determinants of the cross-country dimension of the ratings, and therefore, 
only have a long-run impact. Moreover, the importance of fiscal variables appears stronger 
than in the previous literature.  
The models correctly predict the rating of 40% of the sample and more than 75% of 
the predicted ratings lie within one notch of the observed value. They also correctly predict 
between one third and one half of upgrades and downgrades. In our opinion this is quite 
satisfactory given that the empirical approach used here necessarily neglects two sources of 
information that are known to enter the decision of the rating agencies. On the one hand, 
rating agencies generally state that they cover several qualitative variables in addition to 
quantitative data in the rating process. On the other hand, rating agencies base their 
decision, to some extent, on projected economic developments. Thus, a more 
comprehensive model could also incorporate the agencies’ expectations regarding the 
relevant explanatory variables.  
Although incorporating forward-looking behaviour of agencies into an econometric 
model seems important to study particular episodes of sudden and repeated changes in 
ratings, we think it is not essential for our purposes. First, because most of the countries do 
not have frequent changes in their ratings, timing is not a fundamental issue. Second, even 
if the behaviour of agencies were strictly forward-looking, they still base their projections 
on current information, which should be captured in our modelling. All in all, we believe 
that such attempt to incorporate expectations would remain tentative. 
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Table 1 – Random effects estimation 
 Moody’s S&P Fitch 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 3.431 8.291 4.347 7.421*** 4.409 7.179*** 
 (0.95) (12.49) (1.25) (15.11) (1.19) (13.16) 
GDP per capita 1.779*** 1.789*** 1.411*** 1.403*** 1.697*** 1.667*** 
 (7.61) (8.03) (7.12) (7.67) (8.83) (9.51) 
GDP per capita Avg. 0.650  0.450  0.375  
 (1.46)  (1.05)  (0.87)  
GDP growth 8.643*** 8.768*** 8.125*** 8.256*** 3.385 4.110* 
 (3.07) (3.26) (3.50) (3.72) (1.39) (1.74) 
GDP growth  Avg. 5.237  -1.907  3.220  
 (0.46)  (-0.20)  (0.26)  
Unemployment 0.014  0.055** 0.056*** 0.017  
 (0.52)  (2.53) (2.73) (0.61)  
Unemployment Avg. -0.072* -0.073* -0.018  0.027  
 (-1.78) (-1.70) (-0.45)  (0.50)  
Inflation -0.124* -0.145** -0.235*** -0.229*** -0.107  
 (-1.79) (-2.11) (-6.17) (-6.13) (-1.24)  
Inflation Avg. -0.360* -0.347** -0.427*** -0.353** -0.150  
 (-1.84) (-2.00) (-2.65) (-2.44) (-0.66)  
Gov Debt -0.014** -0.014** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.022*** -0.027*** 
 (-2.38) (-2.53) (-6.61) (-7.22) (-3.82) (-7.30) 
Gov Debt Avg. -0.011 -0.014** -0.010 -0.012** -0.007  
 (-1.49) (-2.24) (-1.34) (-1.97) (-0.69)  
Gov Balance 7.740*** 6.991*** 4.387** 4.411** 4.371  
 (2.77) (2.54) (1.97) (2.01) (1.37)  
Gov Balance Avg. 7.893  5.144  5.220  
 (0.80)  (0.59)  (0.69)  
Gov Effectiveness 0.242  0.370** 0.362** 0.787*** 0.887*** 
 (1.18)  (2.36) (2.47) (4.54) (5.34) 
Gov Effectiveness Avg. 1.906*** 2.470*** 2.370*** 2.758*** 2.155*** 2.741*** 
 (4.06) (6.80) (4.91) (7.75) (4.23) (7.47) 
External Debt -0.004* -0.004* -0.003* -0.003 -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (-1.79) (-1.95) (-1.68) (-1.51) (-2.97) (-2.76) 
External Debt Avg. -0.004** -0.004** -0.006* -0.007** -0.010** -0.011*** 
 (-2.20) (-2.47) (-1.81) (-2.18) (-2.53) (-3.34) 
Current Account -7.246*** -8.760*** -3.700** -3.586** -3.137  
 (-3.67) (-4.84) (-2.18) (-2.18) (-1.16)  
Current Account Avg. -3.321  0.123  2.955  
 (-0.78)  (0.03)  (0.63)  
Reserves 1.423** 1.710*** 0.064  -0.100  
 (3.63) (4.61) (0.19)  (-0.23)  
Reserves Avg. 1.475 1.254 1.909** 1.988** 3.090*** 2.987*** 
 (1.60) (1.43) (2.06) (2.28) (3.59) (3.78) 
Def 1 -1.998*** -2.075*** -1.307*** -1.337*** -1.523*** -1.331*** 
 (-6.87) (-8.11) (-5.23) (-6.74) (-4.13) (-4.60) 
Def 2 -0.015  -0.018  0.075  
 (-0.32)  (-0.33)  (1.15)  
EU (2) 1.598*** 1.650*** 0.415** 0.418** 0.507** 0.554** 
 (6.63) (6.69) (2.41) (2.48) (2.03) (2.40) 
IND 2.289*** 3.157*** 2.831*** 3.438*** 2.781*** 2.634*** 
 (2.89) (4.61) (3.03) (4.69) (2.61) (3.55) 
LAC -0.903*  -0.459  -0.718  
 (-1.93)  (-0.94)  (-1.29)  
R2 0.945 0.940 0.948 0.946 0.947 0.944 
Countries 66 66 65 65 58 58 
Observations 551 557 564 565 480 481 
Hausman Test $ 21.93 (0.06) 14.30  (0.160) 16.77 (0.210) 10.73 (0.467) 12.68 (0.473) 3.68 (0.816) 
 
Notes: The coefficient of the variable with Avg. corresponds to the long-run coefficient (β+η,) while the one without corresponds 
to the short-run coefficient β. White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected). The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, 
**, *** - statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%. $ The null is that RE estimation is consistent and therefore preferable to 
fixed effects. The test statistic is to be compared to a Chi-Square with 13 and 11 degrees of freedom respectively (the number of 
time-varying regressors).  The p-value is in brackets.  
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Table 2 – Random effects ordered probit 
 Moody’s S&P Fitch 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDP per capita 3.422*** 3.349*** 3.246*** 2.686*** 4.087*** 4.160*** 
 (9.40) (9.14) (9.02) (8.12) (12.15) (13.12) 
GDP per capita Avg. 0.478*** 0.562*** 1.117*** 0.614*** 1.132*** 0.913*** 
 (2.75) (3.84) (6.03) (3.94) (7.81) (5.45) 
GDP growth 6.464** 7.852** 5.979* 7.729*** -5.119*  
 (2.06) (2.30) (1.93) (2.60) (-1.73)  
GDP growth  Avg. -9.387**  -8.43*  -6.083  
 (-2.04)  (-1.79)  (-1.31)  
Unemployment 0.016  0.152*** 0.135*** 0.012  
 (0.50)  (4.57) (3.01) (0.36)  
Unemployment Avg. -0.078*** -0.085*** 0.002  -0.073*** -0.033** 
 (-4.40) (-5.18) (0.10)  (-4.40) (-2.09) 
Inflation -0.199 -0.214 -0.353** -0.418*** -0.273** -0.245* 
 (-1.41) (-1.51) (-2.53) (-2.93) (-1.96) (-1.79) 
Inflation Avg. -0.623*** -0.939*** -0.532*** -0.949*** -0.713*** -0.272* 
 (-4.01) (-6.11) (-3.41) (-6.08) (-4.62) (-1.84) 
Gov Debt -0.03*** -0.032*** -0.085*** -0.088*** -0.043*** -0.051*** 
 (-4.61) (-4.94) (-11.90) (-12.41) (-7.24) (-9.07) 
Gov Debt Avg. -0.026*** -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.031*** 0.001  
 (-6.99) (-8.80) (-8.77) (-10.47) (0.26)  
Gov Balance 13.898*** 10.937*** 10.187*** 11.559*** 9.487***  
 (3.74) (2.77) (3.07) (3.32) (3.00)  
Gov Balance Avg. 6.757*  8.873**  22.304*** 21.812*** 
 (1.84)  (2.40)  (6.18) (5.83) 
Gov Effectiveness 0.223  0.707** 0.794** 1.761*** 1.838*** 
 (0.64)  (2.08) (2.42) (4.86) (5.17) 
Gov Effectiveness Avg. 3.679*** 3.547*** 4.606*** 3.752*** 2.722*** 3.104*** 
 (13.46) (15.44) (16.30) (15.62) (11.37) (12.28) 
External Debt -0.004** -0.002** -0.002    
 (-2.29) (-2.21) (-0.79)    
External Debt Avg. -0.004***  -0.008*** -0.014***   
 (-3.11)  (-6.40) (-10.39)   
Current Account -8.57*** -12.863*** -4.899**  2.772  
 (-3.62) (-5.94) (-2.04)  (1.23)  
Current Account Avg. 5.24** 3.723* 18.39*** 5.769** 18.993*** 26.980*** 
 (2.21) (1.73) (7.21) (2.54) (7.89) (11.27) 
Reserves 2.246*** 2.952*** 0.205  -0.549  
 (4.37) (5.82) (0.42)  (-1.14)  
Reserves Avg. 0.416  3.365*** 2.520*** 0.876*  
 (0.88)  (6.94) (5.57) (1.83)  
Def 1 -3.101*** -2.936*** -1.789*** -2.077*** -2.176*** -1.266*** 
 (-12.18) (-11.95) (-8.05) (-9.25) (-9.33) (-6.03) 
EU 2.197*** 2.237*** 0.324  0.336  
 (9.04) (8.90) (1.55)  (1.57)  
IND 3.554*** 3.626*** 3.923*** 5.848*** 4.982*** 6.163*** 
 (7.71) (9.08) (8.18) (11.38) (13.24) (15.54) 
LAC -1.766*** -1.711*** -1.485*** -0.901*** -2.570*** -3.165*** 
 (-7.08) (-8.86) (-6.38) (-4.34) (-11.08) (-13.78) 
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Table 2 (Cont.) – Random effects ordered probit 
 Moody’s S&P Fitch 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 8.13 7.00 3.22 7.63 2.46 3.71 
Cut1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Cut2 2.00 2.06 2.19 2.16 2.35 2.38 
Cut3 3.40 3.36 4.12 4.07 3.33 3.43 
Cut4 4.94 5.01 5.34 5.34 4.64 4.82 
Cut5 5.94 6.14 7.11 7.19 5.77 5.93 
Cut6 7.09 7.35 9.15 9.32 7.51 7.54 
Cut7 8.65 8.92 10.75 10.80 9.13 9.02 
Cut8 10.72 10.75 13.11 12.92 10.80 10.81 
Cut9 11.76 11.82 14.59 14.30 11.82 12.02 
Cut10 12.97 13.13 15.46 14.99 12.92 13.10 
Cut11 14.25 14.49 17.49 16.59 15.30 15.42 
Cut12 15.50 15.72 18.96 18.00 16.99 17.52 
Cut13 17.62 17.50 21.51 19.99 17.63 18.42 
Cut14 19.11 18.86 22.72 21.07 19.85 20.87 
Cut15 20.60 20.26 24.54 23.00 22.11 23.07 
Cut16 21.64 21.26 27.07 25.69 24.06 25.04 
LogLik -566.33 -578.24 -514.45 -531.22 -537.09 -533.09 
Observations 551 557 564 565 553 564 
Equal differences $ 29.26  (0.009) 19.91 (0.133) 52.21 (0.000) 59.68  (0.000) 68.57 (0.000) 70.23 (0.000) 
Jump& [7-8] [7-8]  [9-10] [12-13]  
Different Slopes#   
[2-3 ,5-6, 7-8, 
10-11,12-13, 
14-15, 15-16] 
[2-3, 5-6, 7-8,  
12-13, 14-15, 
15-16] 
[10-11, 13-14, 
14-15,15-16] 
[10-11, 11- 12, 
13-14,14-15, 
15-16] 
Test* 18.22 (0.149) 12.22 (0.510) 19.23  (0.116) 
 
14.02  (0.300) 
 
22.03 (0.037) 
 
16.69 (0.214) 
 
Notes: The coefficient of the variable with Avg. corresponds to the long-run coefficient (β+η), while the one without corresponds 
to the short-run coefficient β. The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** - statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%. $ The 
null is that the differences between categories is equal for all categories. The test statistic is to be compared to a Chi-Square with 
14 degrees of freedom. & Identifies two cut points that have a irregular difference. # Identifies a cluster of categories that seem to 
have a higher slope (increase difficulty in transition between adjacent notches). * The null is that, excluding the jump point, 
within the two identified clusters the slopes are equal. The test statistic is to be compared to a Chi-Square with either 13 degrees 
of freedom (if only a jump or different slopes was identified) or 12 degrees of freedom (if both where identified). The p-value is 
in brackets. The correspondence between the ratings and the cut-off points is specified in (6). 
 
 
Table 3 – Summary of prediction errors 
 
Notes: * prediction error within +/- 1 notch. ** prediction error within +/- 2 notches. 
 Estimation Procedure Obs. 
Prediction error (notches) % Correctly predicted 
% Within 1 
notch * 
% Within 2 
notches ** 
>3 2 1 0 -1 -2 <-3    
Moody’s 
RE with εi 557 1 17 78 361 91 8 1 64.8% 95.2% 99.6% 
RE without  εi 557 21 49 92 188 141 53 13 33.8% 75.6% 93.9% 
Ordered Probit 557 22 35 99 259 86 46 10 46.5% 79.7% 94.3% 
RE Ordered Probit 557 31 59 106 244 71 34 12 43.8% 75.6% 92.3% 
S&P 
RE with εi 565 1 6 80 392 83 2 1 69.4% 98.2% 99.6% 
RE without  εi 565 17 39 98 216 133 52 10 38.2% 79.1% 95.2% 
Ordered Probit 565 24 28 99 262 118 23 11 46.4% 84.8% 93.8% 
RE Ordered Probit 565 25 41 115 218 130 29 6 38.6% 81.9% 94.3% 
Fitch 
RE with εi 481 3 4 63 339 71 1 0 70.5% 98.3% 99.4% 
RE without  εi 481 11 39 93 174 106 57 1 36.2% 77.5% 97.5% 
Ordered Probit 481 17 32 91 209 95 31 6 43.5% 82.1% 95.2% 
RE Ordered Probit 553 29 53 115 191 121 36 8 34.5% 77.2% 93.3% 
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Table 4 – Upgrades and downgrades prediction 
  
 Sample Upgrades 
Predicted 
Upgrades 
Upgrades correctly 
predicted at time Sample Downgrades 
Predicted 
Downgrades 
Downgrades correctly 
predicted at time 
t t+1 t t+1 
Moody's 
RE with εi 60 87 28 17 34 51 16 12 
RE without  εi 60 89 23 16 34 51 17 8 
Ordered Probit 60 127 31 25 34 72 20 8 
RE Ordered Probit 60 101 23 23 34 65 18 8 
S&P 
RE with εi 79 79 31 14 41 52 18 12 
RE without  εi 79 90 34 15 41 61 19 14 
Ordered Probit 79 102 38 14 41 64 20 13 
RE Ordered Probit 79 90 31 15 41 68 20 12 
Fitch 
RE with εi 68 67 25 19 25 34 15 7 
RE without  εi 68 89 24 20 25 53 15 5 
Ordered Probit 69 115 30 24 25 71 15 5 
RE Ordered Probit 89 154 43 29 26 77 13 7 
 
Note: εi - estimated country specific effect. 
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Table 5 – Example of country analysis: variables’ contribution to expected rating changes 
 European countries 
  Portugal Spain Greece Italy Ireland 
R
at
in
g$
  1998 2005 1998 2005 1998 2005 1998 2005 1998 2005 
Moody's Aa2 (15) Aa2 (15) Aa2 (15) Aaa (17) Baa1 (10) A1 (13) Aa3 (14)  Aa2 (15) Aaa (17) Aaa (17) 
S&P AA (15) AA- (14) AA (15) AAA (17) BBB (9) A (12) AA (15) AA- (14) AA+ (16) AAA (17) 
Fitch AA (15) AA (15) AA (15) AAA (17) BBB (9) A (12) AA- (14) AA (15) AAA (17) AAA (17) 
                 
M
oo
dy
's 
Macro  0.53 0.73 0.93 1.69 1.98 2.28 1.33 1.52 1.70 0.91 1.08 1.26 1.46 1.83 2.20 
Government  -0.69 -0.46 -0.23 0.27 0.65 1.03 -0.05 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.14 0.31 0.20 0.39 0.58 
External  0.09 0.12 0.15 0.22 0.31 0.39 0.18 0.24 0.31 0.17 0.24 0.30 0.15 0.21 0.26 
EU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Overall change -0.07 0.39 0.86 2.19 2.95 3.70 1.46 1.75 2.03 1.05 1.46 1.87 1.81 2.43 3.05 
                       
S&
P 
Macro  0.42 0.57 0.73 0.94 1.07 1.20 0.99 1.13 1.27 0.56 0.67 0.77 0.91 1.15 1.38 
Government  -1.06 -0.88 -0.70 0.48 0.77 1.06 -0.13 -0.10 -0.08 0.07 0.21 0.34 0.83 0.98 1.14 
External  0.03 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.14 0.21 0.06 0.11 0.16 0.05 0.11 0.16 0.05 0.09 0.14 
EU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Overall change -0.61 -0.25 0.11 1.49 1.98 2.47 0.91 1.14 1.36 0.69 0.98 1.26 1.78 2.22 2.66 
                       
Fi
tc
h 
Macro  0.90 0.99 1.08 1.78 2.01 2.25 1.43 1.56 1.69 1.06 1.18 1.30 1.92 2.14 2.35 
Government -1.26 -1.05 -0.85 -0.46 -0.13 0.19 -0.11 -0.08 -0.06 -0.45 -0.29 -0.14 0.15 0.31 0.47 
External  -0.06 -0.03 -0.01 -0.16 -0.09 -0.02 -0.13 -0.07 -0.01 -0.12 -0.07 -0.01 -0.11 -0.06 -0.01 
EU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Overall change -0.42 -0.10 0.23 1.16 1.79 2.42 1.19 1.40 1.62 0.49 0.81 1.14 1.97 2.39 2.81 
  
 Emerging economies 
  Brazil Malaysia Mexico South Africa Thailand 
R
at
in
g$
  1998 2005 1998 2005 1998 2005 1998 2005 1998 2005 
Moody's B2( 3) Ba3 (5) Baa3 (8) A3 (11) Ba2 (7) Baa1 (10) Ba1 (7) Baa1 (10) Baa3 (8) Baa1 (10) 
S&P BB- (5) BB- (5) BBB- (8) A- (11) BB (6) BBB (9) BBB- (8) BBB+ (10) BB+ (7) BBB+ (10) 
Fitch B+ (4) BB- (5) BB (6) A- (11) BB (6) BBB (9) BB+ (7) BBB+ (10) BB (6) BBB+ (10) 
                 
M
oo
dy
’s
 Macro  -0.59 -0.49 -0.39 1.00 1.19 1.37 0.95 1.17 1.39 0.79 1.03 1.27 0.91 1.19 1.47 
Government  -0.37 -0.16 0.06 -1.06 -0.79 -0.53 0.26 0.45 0.64 0.34 0.61 0.88 -0.31 -0.14 0.04 
External  -0.15 0.18 0.50 -0.70 -0.35 -0.01 0.13 0.26 0.38 0.28 0.38 0.48 -0.36 -0.12 0.12 
Overall change -1.11 -0.47 0.17 -0.76 0.04 0.83 1.34 1.88 2.42 1.41 2.02 2.64 0.24 0.94 1.64 
                      
S&
P 
Macro  -0.19 -0.16 -0.13 0.77 0.91 1.05 0.71 0.88 1.05 0.86 0.99 1.13 0.70 0.92 1.13 
Government  -1.01 -0.84 -0.67 -0.93 -0.73 -0.53 0.25 0.40 0.54 0.75 0.96 1.17 -0.68 -0.54 -0.40 
External  -0.22 0.06 0.34 -0.56 -0.28 0.00 -0.06 0.04 0.15 0.00 0.08 0.17 -0.15 0.06 0.26 
Overall change -1.42 -0.94 -0.45 -0.71 -0.10 0.52 0.90 1.32 1.73 1.61 2.04 2.46 -0.13 0.43 0.99 
                      
Fi
tc
h 
Macro  -0.56 -0.49 -0.41 1.04 1.14 1.25 1.26 1.39 1.52 0.92 1.09 1.25 0.80 0.89 0.97 
Government  -0.46 -0.28 -0.11 -0.61 -0.40 -0.18 -0.08 0.08 0.24 0.91 1.14 1.37 -0.18 -0.03 0.12 
External  0.72 1.36 2.01 0.12 0.52 0.91 0.13 0.35 0.56 -0.06 0.07 0.20 0.43 0.86 1.28 
Overall change -0.30 0.60 1.49 0.55 1.26 1.97 1.31 1.82 2.32 1.76 2.30 2.83 1.06 1.72 2.38 
 
Notes: The block contributions were calculated using the changes in the variables multiplied by the short-run coefficients estimated by 
random effects ordered probit, and then aggregated. The only exception was unemployment, for which we used the long-run coefficient. The 
upper and lower bounds where calculated using plus and minus one standard deviation. $  The quantitative rating scale is in brackets.  
 
 
